

# State Formation & Political Change

(Fall 2024)

## Overview

Most of the canonical European thinkers of the "Long Nineteenth Century"—such as Smith, Tocqueville, Marx, and Durkheim—assumed that the world was changing, or had already changed, in ways that made it fundamentally different than it had been during the so-called *ancien régime*.

Much of their work concerns, in one way or another, the "how, why, and what" of those changes. This preoccupation makes sense. As Charles Tilly writes, "nineteenth-century European observers were not wrong to think that great changes were happening": capitalism "was undergoing fundamental alterations" and "European states were entering a new era."

This course explores the linked topics of state formation and international change. As such, it covers literature in the fields of international relations, comparative politics, sociology, and history. It aims to raise a number of important questions: what forces drive major political changes in the nature of the state and the international system? What different forms does the state take, and how do those different forms influence political life? How do we study political change? These concerns are not "merely" central to the very emergence of modern social science. They take on new urgency in the face of contemporary transformations in the texture of world politics.

The majority of the course deals with debates about European state formation. There's a "good" reason for this: the (non-archeological) state-formation literature focused, until relatively recently, on European cases. But that could be a huge problem for the study of state formation!

Certainly, that's the general consensus now: that scholars may have gotten a lot of things wrong by focusing on the medieval-to-modern "transition" in European politics. So while we do look at "comparative" cases toward the end of the class, students should keep this mind and raise it in class discussions.

## Requirements

This is a "Departmental Seminar." The idea is that it provides students with a "capstone" experience which is both reading and writing intensive.

Your grade will be based on three components:

### Class Participation (35%)

Regular and informed contributions to the arc of class discussion over the course of the semester. Online and in-class contributions are fungible.

I will communicate outside of class primarily through a Discord server. Whether or not the server also becomes a useful forum for class discussion, and thus a good alternative for participation, depends on the specific mix of people in a course. I've taught classes that involved a vibrant online discussion. I've also taught ones where basically no one ever posted.

## Reaction Essays (30%)

If the class is small, it will proceed along the lines of a (heavily modified) Oxbridge style tutorial. Between at least weeks 3-10, each student will write two 500-1k word paper (about 2-5 double-spaced pages, before references) reacting to a specific week's reading.

Ideally, you will do one of the following: a) find some claim in the piece that strikes you as problematic and build your paper around explaining what's potentially wrong with it; b) evaluate a disagreement — explicit or implicit — between two or more pieces, often from prior weeks; c) discuss the implications of an argument for broader leitmotifs of the course, such as contemporary political change, or, as a last resort, d) construct your paper around one of the "questions to ponder" for that week.

That paper will be due 24 hours before class. The other students in the class will then be required to write 2-3 paragraphs reacting to the paper, which they will submit before the start of class.

I expect these papers to be less than fully baked, but I do expect you to hand in relatively "clean" drafts in terms of grammar, syntax, and formatting (e.g., use of references). Among other pedagogical purposes, these papers will provide me with an opportunity to give you feedback on your writing.

I will modify this assignment to fit the contours of the class, especially with respect to the number of students.

## Final Project (35%)

The final project for the class is a longer research paper on a topic that you're interested in and that I approve. In general, your papers should look at cases or debates that we didn't focus on in class. A very limited set of examples might include: the "developmental state" in East Asia, the debate about the origins of nationalism, the dynamics of Mesopotamian Empires; why China experienced repeated imperial unification but Europe did not; whether warfare-centric explanations make sense of Latin American state formation; or debates about the origins of democratic regimes.

## About the Readings

You should expect the *average* week to require around 140 pages of reading. Some are much shorter, though, and others are longer. Plan accordingly.

You can get almost all of the readings online. For example, a fair number of the books are available on JSTOR. Those that you'll need to acquire yourself are marked with an asterisk: a) Tilly's *Capital, Coercion, and European States* and b) Huang and Kang's *State Formation through Emulation: the East Asian Model*.

Recommended readings are entirely optional. In general, I've put them in order of priority; that is, if you want to dive deeper, you should go down the list.

Don't worry if a session is in a gray font, that's just a note to myself to fill in recommended readings and study questions. I generally like to maintain some flexibility to adapt to the specific things that students do (and don't) get interested in.

## Suggestions

Even though we do not deal with even a small portion of the material that I'd like to cover, the course still ranges widely across theoretical, methodological, and historical issues. *Do not be afraid to look things up online.* I can guarantee that professors routinely check to Wikipedia for basic historical facts and details, for example, and you should definitely do the same.

This course can—particularly if that's the kind of thing that interests you—stray into some pretty complicated issues in social theory. You might find Daniel Little's weblog, "[Understanding Society](#)," a useful resource here. As always, if you have *any* questions about anything you read there, feel free to ask me (or, if pertinent, raise them in class).

## AI

I don't have a problem with students using online aids to sharpen their writing, but you must disclose that you did so. I was, until recently, neutral on ChatGPT and similar LLMs. My policy was that students could use LLMs as long as they cited them and put relevant text in quotation marks. But I'm now more negative on their use.

What changed my mind? A recent article argues, persuasively in my opinion, that LLMs [produce bullshit](#) (in the technical sense of the term):

The problem here isn't that large language models hallucinate, lie, or misrepresent the world in some way. It's that they are not designed to represent the world at all; instead, they are designed to convey convincing lines of text. So when they are provided with a database of some sort, they use this, in one way or another, to make their responses more convincing. But they are not in any real way attempting to convey or transmit the information in the database. As Chirag Shah and Emily Bender put it: "Nothing in the design of language models (whose training task is to predict words given context) is actually designed to handle arithmetic, temporal reasoning, etc. To the extent that they sometimes get the right answer to such questions is only because they happened to synthesize relevant strings out of what was in their training data. No reasoning is involved [...] Similarly, language models are prone to making stuff up [...] because they are not designed to express some underlying set of information in natural language; they are only manipulating the form of language" (Shah & Bender, [2022](#)). These models aren't designed to transmit information, so we shouldn't be too surprised when their assertions turn out to be false.

And:

The idea of ChatGPT as a bullshit machine is a helpful one when combined with the distinction between hard and soft bullshit. Reaching again for the example of the dodgy student paper: we've all, I take it, marked papers where it was obvious that a dictionary or thesaurus had been deployed with a crushing lack of subtlety; where fifty-dollar words are used not because they're the best choice, nor even because they serve to obfuscate the truth, but simply because the author wants to convey an *impression* of understanding and sophistication. It would be inappropriate to call the dictionary a bullshit artist in this case; but it would *not* be inappropriate to call the result bullshit. So perhaps we should, strictly, say not that ChatGPT *is* bullshit but that it *outputs* bullshit in a way that goes beyond being simply a vector of bullshit: it does not and cannot care about the truth of its output, *and* the person using it does so not to convey truth or falsehood but rather to convince the hearer that the text was written by a interested and attentive agent.

For what it's worth, every year I plead with students to use plain, ordinary language. "Don't try to sound like an academic," I say, "For one thing, academics generally suck at writing. For another, you'll wind up look *less* smart when you inevitably misuse words." I point this out not merely because of my 20+ years of experience teaching, but also because I did the same thing in college and, to a lesser extent, in my first year of graduate school.

Anyway, you can still use LLMs if you cite them appropriately. But it defeats one of the key purposes of a Departmental Seminar, which is to think and write critically about the subject matter. Put differently, you'll get less value out of taking the course.

## Schedule

### 1. Introduction & The Case against the State

We discuss some key concepts for the class, including: states, sovereignty, nation, national-state, and bureaucracy.

Close to fifty years ago, the Social Science Research Council funded a large project on "bringing the state back in" to sociology and political science. Which raises a question: how and why did the state get taken out? The "standard story" highlights the book that we are reading this week.

#### Required Readings

- Watkins, Frederick Mundell. *The State as a Concept of Political Science*. Harper & Brothers, 1934, [part I](#) and [part II](#).

#### Questions to ponder

- Watkins claims that we shouldn't build political science around the study of the state. See if you can list his central arguments (there aren't a lot of them) in bullet point form, and offer at least one critical question (or counterargument) to each.

- Watkins argues in favor of a focus on "associations." How well does that address his concerns about "the state"? Can you make a case against "reducing" the state to one organization among many?
- Watkins provides what we might call a "conventional" account of the emergence of the modern state. In broad outlines, what factors—such as economic developments, military considerations, ideological forces—does he emphasize?

## Recommended and Further Readings

- Skinner, Quentin. "[The State](#)." in Terrence Ball et al., eds. *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, pp., 90-131. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Weber, Max. *Economy and Society, Volume I*, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, pp. [48-62](#). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978.
- Skocpol, Theda. "[Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research](#)" in Evans, Peter B., et al., eds. *Bringing the State Back In*, 3-43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Krasner, Stephen D. "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conception and Historical Dynamics." *Comparative Politics* 16,2 (January 1984): 223-246.
- Lenter, Howard H. "The Concept of the State: A Response to Stephen Krasner." *Comparative Politics* 16,3 (April 1984): 367-377.
- Jessop, Bob. "Bringing the State Back in (Yet Again): Reviews, Revisions, Rejections, and Redirections." *International Review of Sociology* 11,2 (2001): 149-171

## 2. Politics without States?

In sociology and political science, the study of "state formation" was, for many years, the study of the emergence of the "modern state" in Europe. But the emergence from what? Until the 1990s, the usual answer was "feudalism." Now historians often use different terminology. They're still talking about so-called "medieval period," stretching at least as far back as the "collapse" of the Carolingian Empire and ending no later than 1450. So if the political units at that time weren't states, what were they? This week looks at that question; it also should get us thinking about the causes of political change.

## Required Readings

- Bartlett, Robert. *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization, and Cultural Change, 950-1350*. Princeton University Press, 1994. pp. 1-84.
- Bisson, Thomas N. "The 'Feudal Revolution'" *Past & Present* 142 (1994): 6-42.

## Questions to ponder:

- What does Bartlett mean by "Latin Christendom"? How, according to Bartlett, did it expand from its "core" in West Francia?
- Why, according to Bisson, did historians generally abandon the idea of a "feudal revolution?" In what ways did they overreact, throwing out the veritable baby with the bath water?
- Bisson's argument, which he develops in detail in his book, [\*The Crisis of the Twelfth Century\*](#), focuses on the emergence of "lordship" as a dominant mode of governance in medieval Europe. What, as best you can tell, does he mean by "lordship" and how is it different than what came before and after?
- List a few similarities and differences between the ways that Bartlett and Bisson describe "medieval Europe." Are there accounts broadly compatible, or are there tensions between them?

## Recommended and Further Readings

- Bisson, Thomas N. [\*The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship, and the Origins of European Government\*](#). Princeton University Press, 2015
- Reynolds, Susan. [\*Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted\*](#), Reprint Edition (New York, Oxford 1996).
- Strayer, Joseph R. [\*On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State\*](#). 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005 (especially Chapters 1-2)
- Sheehan, James. "[The Problem of Sovereignty in European History](#)," *American Historical Review* 111,1 (2006): 1-15.

## Recommended and Further Readings: Other Cases

- David Graeber and David Wingrow. *The Dawn of Everything*. Macmillan, 2021.
- Bard, Kathryn A. "Political Economies of Predynastic Egypt and the Formation of the Early State." *Journal of Archaeological Research* 25, no. 1 (2017): 1-36.
- Powers, Simon T., and Laurent Lehmann. "An evolutionary model explaining the Neolithic transition from egalitarianism to leadership and despotism." [\*Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences\*](#) 281, no. 1791 (2014): 20141349.

## 3. Conceptualizing "the State"

The article this week is widely cited and highly influential. It also provides a good entry point into important concepts like "state autonomy" and "state capacity."

## Required Readings

- Nettl, J.P. "[The State as a Conceptual Variable](#)." *World Politics* 20,4 (July 1968): 559-592.

## Questions to ponder:

- What, according to Nettl, are the key sources of variation among states?
- Does Nettl's approach answer some of the objections offered by Watkins, or does it, in some ways, support Watkins' arguments for decentering the state?
- If we treated the institutions described by Bartlett and Bison as states, where would they fall in terms of Nettl's variables?

## Recommended and Further Readings: State Capacity and Legibility

- Hendrix, Cullen S. "[Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict](#)." *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 3 (2010): 273-85.
- Daron Acemoglu, Camilo García-Jimeno, and James A. Robinson. "[State capacity and economic development: A network approach](#)." *American Economic Review* 105,8 (2015): 2364-2409.
- Melissa M. Lee, and Nan Zhang. "Legibility and the Informational Foundations of State Capacity." *The Journal of Politics* 79, 1 (2017): 118-32, 362.
- Shannon Stimson. "[Rethinking the state: Perspectives on the legibility and reproduction of political societies](#)." *Political Theory* 28, 6 (2000): 822-834.
- Melissa M. Lee. *Crippling Leviathan: How Foreign Subversion Weakens the State*. Cornell University Press, 2020.
- James Scott. *Seeing Like a State*. Yale University Press, 1999.

## 4. Warfare and State Formation I

This week we look at two rather different, but not unrelated, lines of argument. The first gave social scientists the phrase "war made the state and the state made war." The second argues that the so-called "revolution in military affairs" (or "military-technical revolution") of the 1600s explains the emergence of the modern state — what historian Jan Gleason calls the "fiscal military state."

## Required Readings

- Tilly, Charles. "[War and State Making as Organized Crime](#)," in Evans, Peter B., et al., eds. *Bringing the State Back In*, 169-191. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Bean, Richard. "[War and the Birth of the Nation State](#)," *Journal of Economic History* 33,1 (March 1973): 203-221.
- Parker, Geoffrey. "[The 'Military Revolution' 1560-1660—A Myth?](#)". *Journal of Modern History* 48,2 (June 1976): 195-214.

## Questions to ponder

- What was the supposed "Military Revolution" and what were its major components? What is the specific causal logic through which is putatively drove state formation? When thinking about the second question, try to disaggregate the causal sequence and think about the intermediate steps that need to be true for the theory to work.
- In a book that, unfortunately, we don't have time to read Deborah Boucoyannis argues that evidence about the increasing costs of warfare fail to correct for population growth — in other words, that the cost "per capita" of warfare remains relatively flat from the medieval through the early modern period. Does that create problems for the "military revolution" theory of European state formation?
- If changes in military technology and the social organization of warfare drive big changes in the organization of political units, then how might we extend the argument *both* backwards and forwards? Bartlett already provides one way of thinking about how modes of warfare shaped medieval Europe, which might be a good point of reference.

## Recommended Readings: Medieval and Early Modern Europe

- David Eltis. *The Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe*. New York, St. Martin's Press.
- Bruce D. Porter. *War and the Rise of the State*. New York: Free Press, 2002.

## Recommended Readings: Beyond Europe

- Miguel Angel Centeno. *Blood and debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*. Penn State Press, 2002.
- Andreas Wimmer. *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Charles S. Spencer "[Territorial Expansion and Primary State Formation](#)." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 107,16 (2010): 7119-7126.



## 5. Warfare and State Formation II

This week we begin reading Tilly's "big book" on European state formation, which extends and amends his arguments from the "War and State Making as Organized Crime" essay. The overwhelming majority of citations to *Coercion, Capital, and European States* do not differentiate its arguments from the older essay. This is arguably a mistake. The claim here is, some suggest, a good deal more nuanced. It's also a lot harder to follow, so we are splitting it up into two parts.

### Required Readings

- Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1990*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, Chapters 1-4.\*

### Questions to ponder:

- Many social-science works have a single puzzle. Tilly seems to have more than one, although they are closely interrelated. What are they, and if there really are more than one, does it make sense to combine them?
- What makes a unit "politically independent" for Tilly? Does this standard suggest that there are more, or fewer, "states" in the contemporary period than have seats at the United Nations?
- Tilly distinguishes between different periods of European state formation. What are those periods, how are they different, and how do their differences relate to a) last week's arguments about the "revolution in military affairs" and European state formation and b) more recent understandings of the political topography of medieval Europe?
- One of the ways that Tilly talks about political units (states) is as configurations of coercion and capital. What does he mean by these terms (note that a number of commentators think that they're ambiguous categories, and that this is a problem for Tilly)? Why try to conceptualize states this way in the first place? How does it compare to, say, Nettl's article?

### Recommended Readings

- Ertman, Thomas. 1997. *The Birth of Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Eric Grynaviski and Sevrir Steinsson. 2023. "[Wisdom Is Welcome Wherever It Comes From: War, Diffusion, and State Formation in Scandinavia](#)." *International Organization*. 77(2): 294-323
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, Paola Galano Toro, Luc Girardin, and Guy Schvitz. "[War Did Make States: Revisiting the Bellicist Paradigm in Early Modern Europe](#)." *International Organization* 77,2 (2023): 324-62.

## 6. Warfare and State Formation III

### Required Readings

- Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1990*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, Chapters 5-7.\*

### Questions to ponder

- Tilly repeatedly said that he regrets using the term "state formation" and that he should have called the research agenda the study of "state transformation." What could be possibly mean by this? If so inclined, you can [watch](#) Daniel Little's interview with Tilly.
- Tilly's arguments about African (postcolonial) state formation are pretty controversial. What do you make of them?

### Recommended Readings

- LB Kaspersen and J Strandsbjerg, eds. *Does War Make States?: Investigations of Charles Tilly's Historical Sociology*. Cambridge University Press, 2017. See especially Chapter 10, "[How Tilly's State Formation Paradigm is Revolutionizing the Study of Chinese State-making](#)" by Victoria Tin-bor Hui.
- Hui, Victoria Tin-bor. 2004. "[Towards a Dynamic Theory of International Politics: Insights from Comparing Ancient China and Early Modern Europe](#)." *International Organization* 58 (1): 175–205.
- Hui, Victoria Tin-bor. *War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Vivek Swaroop Sharma. "[Kinship, property, and authority: European territorial consolidation reconsidered](#)." *Politics & Society* 43, 2 (2015): 151-180. [Note: this is a really cool piece that doesn't have an obvious "home" in the recommended readings list. If you have a chance, you should definitely check it out].

## 7. Economic Change and European State Formation

Another classic, at least in some circles, of the genre. Tilly was an historical sociologist, but Spruyt's perspective is firmly within the domain of international-relations theory. This might make Chapter 1 difficult, since we haven't focused on the "international side" of the question of state formation. Read it, but if it doesn't make sense to you that's fine. Just note what questions you have and move on.

## Required Readings

- Spruyt, Hendrik. [\*The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change\*](#). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, Entire, but focus on Chapters 2-8.

## Questions to ponder:

- Spruyt's central outcome of interest is twofold: what explains the emergence of the sovereign-territorial state and why did it "triumph" — that is, form the basis of the modern, sovereign-state system. Is Spruyt talking about the same thing as Tilly's "national-state" or the so-called "Weberian state?" Think hard about this one. Perhaps even list ways in which they conceptually overlap (and ways, if any, that they do not).
- Spruyt's research design, at least compared to what we've read so far, is unusual. The first part of his study focuses on what's happening "inside" of states. The second what's happening among them. What are the advantages and disadvantages of this approach, particularly as opposed to Tilly's (arguably) messier presentation?
- Spruyt launches a sustained attack against "unilinear" accounts of state formation. Is this basically the same line of argument as Tilly's criticisms of teleological and overly retrospective approaches to the subject?

## 8. Religion and European State Formation I

### Required Readings

- Philip S Gorski. 1993. "[The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia](#)." *American Journal of Sociology*, 99,2: 265-316.
- Daniel Philpott. 2000. "[The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations](#)." *World Politics* 52,1: 206-45.
- Osiander, Andreas. 2001. "[Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian myth](#)." *International Organization* 55,2: 251-287.

## November 12: Religion and European State Formation II

### Required Readings

- Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2024. "Tilly Goes to Church: the Religious and Medieval Roots of European State Fragmentation." *American Political Science Review* 118, 1: 88-107

- Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2020. "Beyond War and Contracts: The Medieval and Religious Roots of the European state." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 23,1: 19-36.
- Nexon, Daniel H. [\*The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe\*](#). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009: Chapters 1 and 4.

### Recommended and Further Readings

- Nexon, Daniel H. [\*The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe\*](#). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009: Chapters 2, 5-7, 9.
- Møller, Jørgen. 2014. "[Why Europe Avoided Hegemony: A Historical Perspective on the Balance of Power](#)." *International Studies Quarterly* 58 (4): 660–70. [This is a very much a response to the Hui reading(s) that are listed in the recommended list for session 6. While it's primary focus isn't on religion, it dovetails well with the reading from my 2009 book]

## 10. Comparison – Africa

### Required Readings

- Herbst, Jeffrey. [\*States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control\*](#). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.

## 11. Comparison – Middle East

### Required Readings

- Blaydes, Lisa. "[State Building in the Middle East](#)." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20, no. 1 (2017): 487-504.

## 12. Comparison – East Asia

### Required Readings

- Huang, Chin-Hao, and David C. Kang. *State Formation through Emulation: the East Asian Model*. Cambridge University Press, 2022.

## 13. The Balance of Power vs. Hegemony

## Required Readings

- Wohlforth, William C., Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin-bor Hui, Arthur M. Eckstein, Daniel Deudney, and William J. Brenner. 2007. "[Testing Balance-of-Power Theory In World History](#)." *European Journal of International Relations* 13 (2): 155–85.
- Lee, Ji-Young. 2016. "Hegemonic Authority and Domestic Legitimation: Japan and Korea under Chinese Hegemonic Order in Early Modern East Asia." *Security Studies* 25 (2): 320–52. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1171970>.
- Go, Julian. 2008. "[Global Fields and Imperial Forms: Field Theory and the British and American Empires](#)." *Sociological Theory* 26 (3): 201–27.
- Nexon, Daniel H. 2009. "[The Balance of Power in the Balance](#)." *World Politics* 61 (2): 330–59.

## Recommended Readings

- Cederman, Lars-Erik. 1994. "[Emergent Polarity: Analyzing State-Formation and Power Politics](#)." *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (4): 501–33.

## Notes and Questions

- This is a good week to tackle recommended readings, as they generally push deeper into material that's discussed in at least one of the required readings.
- You should think about how well the various arguments "travel" to different times and places, including a) contemporary politics and b) the cases we've read about.
- In some respects—or at least some cases—the emergence of a centralized state might be logically equivalent to systemic balancing failures. To what extent is that true?
- Please note any questions that you have. Some of the readings are "theory heavy," and I want to make sure that we work through any material that doesn't make sense to you.

## 14. Student Project Presentations/International Orders

### Required Readings

- Hui, Victoria Tin-bor. 2004. "[Towards a Dynamic Theory of International Politics: Insights from Comparing Ancient China and Early Modern Europe](#)." *International Organization* 58 (1): 175–205.

- Kiser, Edgar, and Yong Cai. 2003. "[War and Bureaucratization in Qin China: Exploring an Anomalous Case](https://doi.org/10.2307/1519737)." *American Sociological Review* 68 (4): 511–39. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1519737>.
- Kaufman, Stuart. 1997. "[The Fragmentation and Consolidation of International Systems](#)." *International Organization* 51 (2): 173–208.
- Lee, Ji-Young. 2013. "[Diplomatic Ritual as a Power Resource: The Politics of Asymmetry in Early Modern Chinese-Korean Relations](https://doi.org/10.5555/1598-2408-13.2.309)." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 13 (2): 309–36. <https://doi.org/10.5555/1598-2408-13.2.309>.

### Highly Recommended Readings

- Khong, Yuen Foong. 2013. "The American Tributary System." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 6 (1): 1–47. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poto02>.
- Phillips, Andrew. 2017. "Contesting the Confucian Peace: Civilization, Barbarism and International Hierarchy in East Asia." *European Journal of International Relations*, July, 1354066117716265. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066117716265>.
- Zhang, Yongjin, and Barry Buzan. 2012. "The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 5 (1): 3–36. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pos001>.